This is a form of indeterminism that was first emphasized by Earman and Norton (1987) as an interpretative philosophical difficulty for realism on GTR`s description of the world, especially the variety of points M. They showed that realism about diversity as part of the furniture of the universe (which they called “multiple nounvalism”) forces us to automatic indeterminism in GTR (as described above), and they argued that this is unacceptable. (See lochargument and Hoefer (1996) for a response in the name of the space-time realist and discussion of other responses.) For now, we will only note that this indeterminism, unlike most of the others we discuss in this section, is empirically undetectable: our two models and the offset model are empirically indistinguishable. Now you can take a hard line in the case of Beth (McKenna 2004). Such an attitude might include noting that if Beth acquired her new values in a strange way (and in a way that involved a moral injustice done to her), everyone acquires her values in a way that is not completely under her control. In fact, following the argument of Galen Strawson (1994) described in § 3.3.2, it could be noted that no one has ultimate control over their values, and even if normal agents have some ability to process and modify their values, the disposition factors that determine how this ability is used are ultimately the result of factors, that are beyond the control of the agents. So it may not be as clear as it seems at first glance that Beth is different from normal agents in terms of autonomous powers and moral responsibility for her behavior. But this reasoning can cut back in both directions: instead of showing that Beth is assimilated into the class of normal and responsible agents, it could show that normal agents are assimilated into the class of non-responsible agents like Beth. The argument of the four cases of Derk Pereboom uses a maneuver in this direction (1995, 2001, 2007, 2014). The strangeness goes even further.

Since it is physically impossible to be logically incompatible with a law of nature, then any existential false statement such as “An S is P” or “There is an S that is a P” would prove not only false, but physically impossible. Causal determinism is, roughly, the idea that every event is necessary by previous events and conditions as well as by the laws of nature. The idea is old, but became the subject of clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply linked to our understanding of the natural sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and to our views on human free action, on the other. In these two general areas, there is no agreement on whether determinism is true (or even whether it can be known as true or false) and what the meaning would be for human action in both cases. The typical explanation of determinism is limited to the state of the (entire) world at any given time (or time), for various reasons. We will briefly explain some of them. Why take as a starting point the state of the whole world and not a (perhaps very large) region? One might intuitively think that it would be enough to indicate the complete state of things on Earth, say, or perhaps throughout the solar system, to correct what happens after (at least for a while). Keep in mind, however, that all kinds of influences outside the solar system arrive at the speed of light, and they can have significant effects. Suppose Mary looks at the sky on a clear night and a particularly bright blue star catches her attention; she thinks, “What a beautiful star; I think I`ll stay outside a little longer and enjoy the view. The state of the solar system a month ago did not stipulate that Sirius` blue light would arrive and hit Mary`s retina; It arrived in the solar system only a day ago, let`s say.

For Mary`s actions (and therefore all physical events in general) to be corrected by the state of affairs a month ago, this state must obviously be determined over a space region much larger than the solar system. (If no physical influence can go faster than light, then the state of affairs must be given on a spherical spatial volume of 1 month of light in the radius.) Most often – and this is part of the basis of popular wisdom – physicists have solved the problem of quantum measurement by postulating that a process of “collapse of the wave function” occurs during measurements or observations that interrupt Schrödinger`s evolution. The collapse process is usually postulated as indeterministic, where probabilities for different outcomes can be calculated via Born`s rule based on the wave function of a system. The once common Copenhagen interpretation of quality management postulates such a collapse. It has the advantage of solving some problems such as Schrödinger`s infamous cat paradox, but few philosophers or physicists can take it very seriously unless they are instrumentalists of the theory. The reason is simple: the process of collapse is not physically well defined, is characterized by an anthropomorphic term (measure) and seems too ad hoc to be a fundamental part of the laws of nature. [8] On the other hand, one might think that if the two assassins mentioned are identical in terms of values, goals, intentions and motivations, adding a little luck to the story of the unsuccessful assassin cannot create a deep contrast between these two agents in terms of moral responsibility. One way to maintain this position is to argue that moral responsibility is solely a function of agents` internal characteristics, such as their motivations and intentions (Khoury 2018; see also Enoch & Marmor 2007 for some of the main arguments against moral happiness). Of course, the successful assassin is responsible for something (killing a person) for which the unsuccessful assassin is not responsible, but it might be possible to argue that both are morally responsible – and probably guilty – to the same extent, to the extent that it was true for both they wanted to kill, and that they did so for the same reasons and with the same level of commitment, to achieve this result (see M.